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5Introduction
As part of its 25th anniversary celebrations, swisspeace hosted an academic 
workshop which aimed at bringing together a wide range of scholars to reflect 
on the self-understanding of peace research, its relation to policy and 
practice, theoretical and methodological considerations as well as bench-
marks for quality assessment and evaluation. This working paper is a 
collection of these reflections on the various challenges of peace research. 
Being limited to the volume of a working paper, this publication by no means 
aspires to cover all these issues in depth. However, the eight contributions 
cover a number of important and timely aspects in the field. 
 They include the tension between the objective of doing critical 
research and being of practical relevance at the same time: this tension refers 
to one of the most challenging aspirations of peace research, because it builds 
on the expectation towards peace practitioners critically reflect their own 
doing. But it also builds on the readiness of researchers not to identify too 
much with the policy field they observe. The latter has been particularly open 
for discussion over the past twenty years due to the tremendous development 
of peacebuilding. In terms of methodology, peace research ranges from 
quantitative to ethnographic approaches, each with their particular opportu-
nities and caveats. We included examples from both worlds and additionally 
gave attention to particular approaches with theoretical and methodological 
implications such as gender and hybridity. The “right” evaluation of peace 
research depends of course on the understanding of this research and the 
expectations which follow from it. This last point represents a different kind 
of challenge: it establishes a bridge between the content and the framework  
in which peace research may develop and prosper.  
 Wishing you a pleasant read and thanking all the authors for their 
insightful contributions.
Laurent Goetschel and Sandra Pfluger    
Bern, October 2014
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Revisiting Peace and Conflict Studies
Tobias Hagmann
There are many ways of characterising peace and conflict – whether we define 
peace merely as the absence of violence or as co-existence among people, or 
whether we define conflict as 1000 or more battle deaths per year or simply as 
incompatible interests.1 Independent of disciplinary tradition ‘peace’ and 
‘conflict’ have different meanings for different people.
 Personal exposure is crucial in how we approach and define these 
‘social things’ that peace and conflict are. Someone who was displaced by war 
or lost a family member attaches different meaning to them than a person 
who had the privilege of growing up in peaceful Western Europe. If we are to 
think about peace and conflict, we first need to interrogate our own experi-
ences of peace and conflict both at a personal and collective level. Peace and 
conflict are among the most normative concepts within the social sciences. 
We therefore need to constantly take distance from them, in a rigorous effort 
of epistemological rupture, if we want to get to the bottom of things. This 
implies that we are aware of our own peace and conflict experiences as they 
are formative of how we study peace and conflict.
 In this article, I will first draw attention to the surprising, but ultimately 
problematic trajectory of peace studies from the period of the Cold War to the 
present day. This is a trajectory from ‘peace’ as a critique of dominant geopol-
itics to one of ‘peace’ that has become part of the very dominant geopolitics it 
initially set out to criticise. Secondly, I will map – undoubtedly in cursory and 
incomplete fashion – the scholarly communities and literatures dealing with 
questions of peace and conflict. Rather than a literature review or an attempt 
at synthesis, my purpose is to highlight the broad variety of existing units of 
analysis, motivations, theories and methodologies of peace and conflict 
studies. Thirdly, I will propose a number of suggestions for a research attitude 
that, in absence of a better word, I subsume under the heading of ‘critical 
peace and conflict research’, striving to understand peace and conflict as 
concomitantly subjective and objective, as critique and hegemony, as 
normative and value-free, as local and global.
1.1 Peace As Critique, Peace As Hegemony
The paradox of peace research is not so much its inability to prevent or 
mitigate highly escalated conflict, namely war, but that ‘peace’ itself has, once 
again, become part of the dominant order. In other words, while positive peace 
and in extension a fair amount of peace research were part of a critique to the 
status quo of Cold War politics, positive peace has gradually become 
normalised since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Peace is no longer part of a 
critique to global politics, but has been domesticated by the anti-politics 
machine of international aid.
 In the 1970s and 1980s, peace researchers wished that donors took 
their insights more seriously. Today, conflict analysis and mapping, stake-
holder identification, conflict issues and drivers, alternative dispute 
1 Instead of the usual in text references,  
I suggest a number of readings that have 
informed my argument after the conclu-
sion.
82 Talk given at the International Studies 
Association, San Diego, 4 April 2012.
resolution, the famous dictum that ‘no need to fight for the orange – one party 
can use its flesh and the other the skin’ are staple ingredients of civilian 
peacebuilding. While peace was political with a capital P during the Cold War 
and therefore not part of the realm of development, which was – falsely of 
course – framed as technical, peacebuilding today is a mundane task 
performed by NGOs. Training community members in conflict resolution, 
organising dialogue forums, encouraging beneficiaries to engage in some sort 
of joint project activity are common peacebuilding activities around the globe. 
Laudable in their objective, civilian peacebuilding is often informed by 
questionable assumptions about the supposedly aggressive nature of its 
target groups. Frequently it reveals deeply engrained prejudices about local 
populations. This type of civilian peacebuilding is paternalistic and orientalist. 
It conveniently ignores local agency, complexity and power relations by 
reducing conflict to a behavioural problem.
 As international aid agencies compressed positive peace into the logic 
of project cycle management, peace has become increasingly instrumentalist 
and prescriptive. Peace is no longer political, but it is plannable and 
measurable, a composite of indicators that can be evaluated once the project 
draws to its close. This is a shallow peace, not real peace. Not the kind of 
peace that addresses inequality, domination or power imbalances. It is ‘donor 
peace’, modelled on the same vague yet orthodox idea of liberal peace, which 
is held to be universal and exportable like spare car parts. Donor peace is a 
sophisticated type of pacification that seeks to change target groups’ 
behaviour not with the threat of military might but with the persuasion of per 
diems. When most pronounced, donor peace shares many traits with neoliber-
alism as it concomitantly commodifies, bureaucratises and individualises 
peace. In the most extreme, violent conflict in the global South is no longer 
viewed in terms of struggles for rights, liberation or self-determination, but as 
criminal, senseless and/or threatening Western security interests. As Mark 
Laffey recently put it: ‘It is OK to pursue violence in the name of liberal peace’,2 
but all other types of violence are considered illegitimate and need to be 
eliminated, read pacified.
 If we agree that the triumph of liberal peacebuilding has proven 
problematic for it depoliticises rather than emancipates existing relations of 
domination, what is the implication for peace researchers? Should we engage 
in a radical critique of peacebuilding practices and discourses, denouncing it 
as a (neo)colonial machination? Should we abandon the concept of peace all 
together? Do we need to redefine peace? Or must we look for peace in 
different places? Can we maintain peace research’s historic normative 
commitment to peace, which has set it apart from other disciplines? Is it 
possible to study peace without reproducing the problematic effects of 
peacebuilding? I shall return to this matter.
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91.2 Disciplinary Traditions
Peace and conflict mean very different things in different disciplines and 
there is an apparent disconnect between different disciplines and bodies of 
literature in how they approach peace and conflict. My choice of bodies of 
literature is admittedly selective and I am leaving out other important fields of 
inquiry. Moreover these bodies are overlapping rather than mutually exclusive. 
I will cursorily, and probably unfairly, present five bodies of literature and 
scholarly communities, highlighting how they study peace and conflict, their 
assumptions, methods and respective contribution.
 Let me begin with the applied peacebuilding literature. This literature 
flourished in studies by think tanks, consultancy reports and, occasionally, 
academic publications. Its axiomatic belief is that peace can be facilitated by 
what are assumed to be well-meaning external actors who support local civil 
society in preventing, dealing with and overcoming violent conflict. The 
applied peacebuilding literature operates in intellectual proximity to, and 
sometimes even personal congruence with, donor and NGO peacebuilding 
programmes. At its best, it highlights the operational challenges and complex-
ities faced by peacebuilders. At its worst, it reproduces paternalist stereo-
types associated with donor peace. 
 This body of work has a heavy normative baggage and vocabulary.3 It 
takes peace, meaning liberal peace, essentially for granted and considers 
violence as dysfunctional. Applied peacebuilding scholars rarely make use of 
rigorous research designs, instead preferring to offer causal assumptions that 
are often intuitively appealing, but scarcely reflected upon. The main contri-
bution of the applied peacebuilding literature is the provision of a peace-
building narrative on which donors and NGOs recurrently draw when devising 
or justifying their projects.
 Political scientists and some economists who study peace and war by 
dint of large N research designs represent another important group within 
academic conflict research. This body of literature, predominantly published 
in the Journal of Peace Research, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution, has 
turned the study of peace and conflict into a natural science. In other words, 
violence is transposed into numbers. Ever more elaborate datasets on all 
aspects of peace and conflict – from peace agreements to military expend-
iture to battle deaths, for instance the famous Correlates of War database 
– drive this scholarly field. 
 Large N conflict researchers are solidly positivist and favour negative 
peace definitions. Their aim is to unlock the inner secrets and mechanics of 
the onset, dynamics and termination of armed conflict, mostly civil war. Their 
assumptions are that (1) human beings seek to maximise utility and (2) conflict 
can be studied with little knowledge of context and history as regression 
analysis and agent-based modelling provide clues to the evolution of warfare. 
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3 For example, designating groups opposed 
to a peaceful settlement as ‘spoilers’.
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 4 See, Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2006). 
Anthropology and Development: under-
standing contemporary social change. 
London: Zed Books.
5 See, for example, the University of 
Pennsylvania’s book series “The ethno-
graphy of political violence”.
Members of this scholarly community are intellectually indebted to IR thinking 
as they tend to prefer governments, states and political order, viewing armed 
rebellion with considerable suspicion.
 The major contribution of this literature is to identify recurrent patterns 
and overall trends of political violence over time. In recent years, more disag-
gregated databases and the use of GIS have made large N conflict research 
more appealing. This literature is, however and ultimately, unable to capture 
or connect with the everyday experiences of those living in conflict. It thus 
often remains a methodologically sophisticated abstraction of human 
suffering.
 Next, a heterogeneous but influential group of scholars has critically 
scrutinised the rise of international peacebuilding and – closely related 
– statebuilding practices and discourses of the past two decades. These 
scholars draw on political economy, on post-colonial and on post-structuralist 
theories to make sense of what they consider an imposition of liberal peace by 
the West on the rest. 
 While applied peacebuilding scholars see international intervention as 
part of the solution, critics of liberal peace regard it as part of the problem. In 
line with earlier critics of Western imperialism, this scholarship interprets 
international peacebuilding and statebuilding as elaborate attempts by OECD 
countries to neoliberalise the global South in their own image, and for their 
own interest. Authors of this research strand mostly adopt single or compar-
ative case study research strategies and are strong in discourse analysis, at 
times also in field research.
 Their major contribution is to embed international peacebuilding in 
broader patterns of capitalist production and geopolitics, which operate 
through multiple avenues, both practical and discursive. Its strength lies in its 
post-positive theoretical framing. This literature has, however, a tendency to 
‘totalise’ the most minute speech act or event or bureaucratic programme into 
an all-encompassing governmentality. It is more concerned with the violence 
manifest in symbolic domination than of real life physical coercion. More 
importantly, it rarely takes into consideration local agency, norms and 
patterns of resistance that so often bifurcate international aid through 
processes of ‘side tracking’ or ‘selected appropriation’.4  
 Anthropologists of violence have arguably provided the most empirically 
detailed studies of what people experience in conflict zones.5 While anthro-
pologists have historically, with few exceptions, studied societies in peaceful 
settings, in recent years ethnographies of civil war, (ethno-)national violence 
and state repression have dramatically expanded a more anthropocentric 
understanding of political violence. 
 Contrary to much of peace research, anthropologists of violence see 
violence not only as destructive, but as constitutive of social relations. As 
Revisiting Peace and Conflict Studies
11
6 See, Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2001). 
Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Washing-
ton D.C.: World Bank and Kaldor, M. (2002). 
New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in 
a Global Era. Cambridge/ UK: Cambridge 
Polity Press.
humans cope with, succumb to, navigate and survive warfare, individual and 
collective strategies of dealing with conflict become apparent. Armed conflict 
is associated with danger, displacement, sufferance and fear. But it also 
offers opportunities for some, creates new communities, and shapes political 
identities. This body of literature predominantly relies on multi-sited ethnog-
raphies during field research.
 It mainly contributes to emplacing, to contextualising peace and 
conflict empirically, drawing attention to the social condition that is war. This 
literature has two additional strengths: (1) it is more sensitive and reflective 
about the role of researchers in representing or writing about peace and 
conflict, an aspect missing in the other research strands, and (2) anthropolo-
gists of violence are able to shame the reductionism of certain conflict 
analyses – think ‘greed vs. grievance’ or ‘old vs. new wars’ – by recourse to 
in-depth area studies knowledge accumulated during repeat field visits.6 
 Lastly, the geography of peace, conflict and violence literature is 
noteworthy in this context. Markedly variegated in terms of methodology, 
regional focus, and theories, geographers of peace and conflict dissect the 
territorial and spatial dimensions of contentious politics, namely violent 
nationalism. An older generation of geopolitics specialist explained interstate 
conflict through the lenses of land and sea, rivers and forest, steppe and 
mountains, built and open environment. Proponents of the critical geopolitics 
school analyse the imagined and cartographic construction of superpowers. 
Geographers of resource conflicts investigate the nexus between civil war and 
a range of both renewable and non-renewable resources. More theoretically 
inclined geographers discuss contemporary geopolitics, security policy and 
counter-terrorism in terms of scale, networks, flows, sovereignty, territory and 
empire. This literature reminds us that all politics is spatial, and therefore also 
temporal.
1.3 Critical Peace And Conflict Research
What are the implications of the above trends for future research then? Should 
we continue the business of peace and conflict studies as usual? Or do we 
need to make our work more relevant and meaningful by rethinking some of 
our assumptions? What attitude then should a critical peace and conflict 
researcher embody? A critical peace and conflict researcher readily engages 
with the emotional destructiveness that accompanies political violence, yet 
takes neither ‘peace’ nor ‘conflict’ for granted, knowing very well that some 
types of ‘peace’ are more brutal than conflict and that some types of ‘conflict’ 
are the product of legitimate struggles. Such a starting point leads us to 
reconstruct the actions and narratives of all actors involved, local and trans-
national, with a keen awareness that not all actions are equal and that every 
narrative has its counter-narrative.
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 Critical peace and conflict researchers know that violent conflict is 
always tragic, but never archaic or antiquated – even if the weapons used lack 
the sophistication of high-tech militaries. Contemporary conflicts are 
thoroughly modern. Critical peace and conflict researchers are sensitive to 
power relations not only in conflict zones, but also in the production of 
knowledge about conflicts and their dynamics. They accept that no matter 
how many layers of propaganda, suffering, hypocrisy and delusion we 
penetrate with data collection, a part of our analysis remains contested. 
Critical peace and conflict researchers know that no one theory can explain 
the multitude of motivations and trajectories that mark individuals and 
communities in violent times.
 Critical peace and conflict researchers are aware that their object of 
inquiry is as material as it is symbolic, as hard as it is soft, as enduring as it is 
malleable. They realise that if they study a conflict long enough, keeping 
emotional distance becomes increasingly impossible as we become part of 
the conflict. Critical peace and conflict researchers know that violence will 
always exist, taking different forms over time. But they also know that 
particular conflicts will subside eventually as humans strive for peace as 
much as they strive for status, domination and recognition.
Revisiting Peace and Conflict Studies
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2  
Peace During and After 
the Age of Intervention1
Oliver P. Richmond
UN peacekeeping during the Cold War was founded upon the need to maintain 
consent amongst host populations, state elites and the international 
community, from which an efficient, cheap and limited policing-style quasi-
military/diplomatic intervention could unfold. Under these circumstances, 
impartiality and non-intervention would ensure the continuation of consent 
and the bare minimum of a cease-fire might be maintained, in the interests  
of sustaining the Cold War state-centric order. This would minimise overt 
violence and create a short-term, negative peace, built around a cease-fire 
agreement (James, 1969).
 From a critical perspective, such intervention also had the effect of 
upholding the post-war hierarchy of states and the global political economy, 
as well as maintaining a sense of the superiority of the liberal-realist tradi-
tions that dominated US and European international relations (IR) narratives 
about intervention, progressive politics and acceptable forms of statehood in 
the post-colonial world. However, sensitivity towards the interests and role of 
former colonial powers and the new superpowers meant that intervention, 
even to end war through liberal peacebuilding, became politicised and contro-
versial, either as ideologically motivated or as an attack on the principle of 
sovereignty. The concepts of human security, preventative diplomacy, as well 
as the responsibility to protect, all came under such fire despite offering a 
more progressive line of thought about peace in significant ways.
 This paper outlines the implications of the critical debate surrounding 
these evolving forms of intervention. It does so by interrogating two important 
strands of their evolution. Firstly, it underlines the inconsistencies and 
injustices perpetuated despite, or because of, such practices, through 
historical, structural and discursive framings. Secondly, it engages with the 
hints of, and possibilities for, emerging emancipatory practices through 
significantly modified processes, or through new alternatives.
2.1 Critical Perspectives of Limitations 
 in Previous Research
Cold War peacekeeping was a major contribution in the sense of providing  
a tool through which a preliminary negative peace could emerge while 
maintaining the current status quo, Cold War and post-colonial dynamics 
included. It was soon realised that its negative peace could provide a basis for 
a more ambitious peacemaking process, which might reconstitute the state 
along more liberal lines, as was the case with the attempts at UN mediation in 
the Cyprus conflict in the mid-1960s (see for example United Nations, 1965). 
This ambition was partly spurred by the necessity of avoiding any relapse into 
conflict, but also by growing - and UN-supported (Mazower, 2012) - expecta-
tions of more progressive forms of politics at the international and domestic 
levels. Indeed many subjects of such interventions in conflict-affected 
societies welcomed liberal reforms along with the removal of discriminatory 
power structures and elites.
1 This is a considerably shortened version of 
the original paper which was published in 
the Journal of International Peacekeeping 
2014, 21(4), 509-519. 
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 After the Cold War, integrated missions and peacebuilding interventions 
radically extended conflict management’s logic, indicating an ambition to 
create a liberal peace and state, even without the consent of populations, 
factions or indeed elites. This reflected a political and economic rationality 
that had become clear in the role of the international financial institutions in 
post-socialist countries at the end of the Cold War (IBRD and World Bank, 
2005). It involved a top-down reconstruction of regional order, the state, its 
institutions and law, its economy and society. International consent and 
legitimacy were preferable but not necessarily required, whilst local consent 
and legitimacy were not required and perhaps not even preferable.
 Light and heavy footprint approaches were experimented with during 
this era: light footprint approaches aimed to improve local consent and 
legitimacy and to avoid overextension, whereas heavy footprint approaches 
served to ensure that local pathologies of power did not upset the new, liberal 
peace (see for example Suhrke, 2011a). But such ‘integrated’ approaches have 
threatened or destabilised local and international power structures while 
trying to produce order, challenged national sovereignty, stretched the 
capacity of the international community to the limits, tested its resolve and 
exposed hegemonic interests.
 More efficient and elaborate forms of conflict management have 
emerged in an evolutionary process rather than by design. The latest is 
statebuilding (already waning in policy appeal), which to critical thinkers is an 
ideological and bureaucratic contamination of the earlier goals associated 
with liberal norms, humanitarianism and human security. Nevertheless, all 
these approaches tend to suffer from a range of destabilising consequences. 
Firstly, they avoid or compromise on sensitive diplomatic problems, preferring 
instead the exercise of power or a fudged resolution. Secondly, a limited 
power-sharing framework tends to be developed more or less always within 
the confines of territorial sovereignty (eschewing some of the more positive 
lessons of the European project). Thirdly, they depend on very limited 
resources to provide security, development and rights, preferring efficiency 
over justice. Approaches to peace and development fare poorly relative to 
arms budgets or extractive industrial investment (Archer and Willi, 2012). 
Fourthly, they often weaken the need for pluralism with respect to identity 
problems, preferring instead to use territorial division to establish power-
sharing mechanisms. Fifthly, they avoid discussions of justice in historical and 
contemporary, local and global settings, especially vis-à-vis material aspects 
of conflict, meaning the issues of the dispute are not addressed. Finally, they 
avoid questions of deep reconciliation, and ultimately end up replicating 
exclusion and division albeit in softened form. 
 Liberal peacebuilding duties create significant pressure because 
integrated missions have long moved away from a broad local, social-to-elite 
consent basis. The question is whether the later generations of peacekeepers 
are, in a sense, architects of their own downfall because they have neglected 
local sites of legitimate authority in favour of the liberal international, which 
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itself has limited capacities for enforcement or conditionality. Recent 
tendencies towards trusteeship in order to compensate for local opposition 
and insurgency (as in BiH, Iraq or Afghanistan), or light footprint engagements 
designed to promote local ‘resilience’ (Chandler, 2012), skirt around the 
problem of how to make a progressive peace that its subjects feel is 
legitimate.
 Such interventionism has been constantly challenged, however, not  
just by ‘spoilers’ as with the Taliban in Afghanistan, but by local populations 
concerned with global distributive justice, the erosion of identity, the role- 
back of state welfare, the onslaught of international capital, the loss of 
long-standing patronage frameworks and localised forms of legitimate 
authority. Thus, such approaches appear not to herald peace and progress  
but indeed offer new disruptions as noted across the Balkans with the growing 
phenomena of nostalgia for the old Yugoslav system (Judah, 2009). Such 
problem-solving approaches appeared to be status quo oriented, seeking to 
‘stabilise’ (e.g. the UK military now have a policy aimed at ‘stabilisation’)2 a 
homogenous states-system subject to international capital rather than a just 
international order. 
 This opposition is over the terms of progressive peace in the 21st 
century in normative and ideological terms, and over how it might be organised 
and supported. It raises a number of challenges related to structural North/
South inequality and representation, the naturalisation of the currently 
unequal international order, continuing socio-economic and gender inequality 
(see for example Björkdahl and Mannergren, 2013), the problem or issue of 
identity and its implications for institutional and legal design, the issue of 
legitimacy and consent, and the securitising impacts of the 'bunkerisation'  
of the aid, peace and development industry. 
2.2 New Directions: Modifications or Alternatives?
Peace operations have become overloaded by a range of humanitarian, 
political (and ideological), technical and administrative, as well as develop-
mental tasks. Peacekeeping style activities continue to substitute for the 
often limited Weberian state control of the means of violence, or oversee its 
development. In Cyprus, regional security concerns have displaced political, 
legal and social concerns with a relatively comfortable status quo, which has 
become almost unbreachable by a peace settlement even within the EU. In 
Kosovo security concerns meant the co-optation of political institutions into 
an ethno-nationalist, self-determination state project (albeit one with some 
guarantees for minorities). In BiH it has meant trusteeship-style governance 
and deadlock over a type of state and economic model few support (other 
than, perhaps, in terms of ethno-nationalism) and, ultimately, recent social 
unrest.3 In Afghanistan ‘war on terror’-driven intervention and reform toward a 
‘good enough’ state have become the target of a new wave of violence by those 
excluded, notably the Taliban, meaning that all internationals, from the 
military to peacebuilders, have become targets. 
2 Thanks to Roger Mac Ginty for this point.
3 “The latest troubles in Bosnia may wake 
up the country’s inept leaders”, The Econo-
mist, 15th February, 2014.
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 None of these examples suggest that the aspirations for positive peace, 
liberal peace, democracy, human rights, development, human or state secu- 
rity have been achieved through the contemporary mix of peace, institutions, 
law, markets, technology and intervention. 
 This raises the question of whether a return to simpler, or more consent-
based, quasi-neutral and impartial approaches might be better in order to 
foreground locally-driven solutions. But this could not, in a globalised world 
and an embedded international system, produce radical alternatives, though 
it suggests a lot more flexibility and local ownership. Could a progressive 
peace connected to various forms of intervention be made more plausible and 
legitimate across local-scale contexts, and might consent-oriented 
approaches be more appropriate frameworks through which to respond to root 
causes? How might ethno-nationalist politicians be persuaded to negotiate for 
a pluralist entity? How might ideologically opposed liberation movements, or 
violent factions with other motivations, be brought into peace processes, thus 
mitigating the possibility of peacekeeping and peacebuilding being caught up 
in fresh outbreaks of political violence (as in Sri Lanka in 2007, but also at 
various points in Timor Leste, Kosovo and Sierra Leone)? 
 These are especially important questions now that critical positions on 
the connection between peace and progressive forms of politics are widely 
accepted and aspired to. It is unlikely that the liberal peace/ neoliberal state 
system can deal with most of the claims that are being made. Rather peace 
missions will support hybrid forms of peace (Richmond, 2014), where legit-
imacy is measured from a mixture of local, state and international perspec-
tives. Does the related ‘local turn’ (see amongst others Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2013; Autesserre 2010; Kappler, 2014), the need for which has been 
well illustrated by recent work on the DRC or BiH among many other cases, 
and the need for greater legitimacy on the ground require less intervention 
(Suhrke, 2011b) but perhaps more ‘enablement’ of local agency (see above 
IBRD and World Bank, 2005)?
 Critical theory is in general suspicious of inequalities and injustices in 
IR as well as the exercise of power, and has been a natural contributor to the 
debates about what type of peace and states-system is being negotiated, 
mediated, kept or built.4 One strand of the debate, however, is comfortable 
with the idea that the liberal peace system needs to be maintained by the use 
of force if necessary because it at least provides for rights and representation 
in a thinly cosmopolitan international community. This approach has 
converged on a ‘trusteeship’ project for peacebuilding and statebuilding (see 
for example Ignatieff, 2003), which merely requires the implementation of 
liberal peace and neoliberal statebuilding. Another strand of critical theory is 
much more concerned about the fact that even this cosmopolitan project is 
contaminated by great power interests, capitalist ideology and Eurocentric 
preferences, and is also failing to deal decisively with inequality or injustice, 
local or historical. These two versions may be differentiated in the Coxian 
sense: problem-solving approaches culminate in the refinement of the existing 4 For a survey, see Richmond, 2008.
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international order aimed at liberal or neoliberal peace (leading in practice to  
a negative hybrid form), while critical approaches require structural transfor-
mation if a sustainable (and so probably positive hybrid) peace is to emerge 
(Cox, 1981).
2.3 Conclusion: Implications for Future Research 
The goal of ending violence (both overt and structural), whilst avoiding using 
violence (both overt and structural), is a critical goal for a world in which 
rights, democracy, justice and independence are equated with more positive, 
emancipatory and empathetic forms of peace.
 Engagement with and enablement of local agency, peace formation 
from below and micro-level understandings of the requirements of what would 
potentially create a positive hybrid form of peace are necessary. A peace 
process may be defined as progressive in the eyes of broad local constitu-
encies, as well as vis-à-vis international norms. Indeed, the local scale 
provides a positionality from which the specific modalities of structural 
reform at the state and international level can both be understood and also 
evaluated. The broad requirements of peace when seen from below determine 
- at least partly - what may be progressive about the state and the interna-
tional’s contribution to peace.
 Managing expectations has been very difficult. Nationalism, discrimi-
nation and non-democratic or capitalist power structures are condemned by 
internationals, who are nonetheless often forced to work with the authori-
tarian state forms they have produced- as in Cambodia and Rwanda. Hints of 
paternalism, trusteeship, illiberal governance, as well as the problem of global 
inequality tend to be condemned by host governments and populations alike. 
 In the light of these difficult debates, some clear assertions can be 
made about new generations of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and state-
building, as well as their implications for the international system. The 
conflict-affected subject is the focus of peace interventions, but  must be 
understood to be the basis for legitimacy and politically autonomous rather 
than as the subject of intervention and modernisation. The architecture of a 
progressive peace must emanate from a wide variety of local to international 
scale contexts and be reflected in the structural reform of the machinery and 
models of peace at the international level. But this should be subject-driven. 
This means there cannot be a single blueprint approach, and the form of state 
and economic model will vary. This should reflect both local legitimacy and 
international (i.e. not merely northern/elite) legitimacy and a broad, global (i.e. 
not northern) scientific consensus as the basis for a progressive form of 
politics within the state. 
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 These comments call for a research agenda that is defined by the 
subjects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding - a radical re-orientation of 
research away from the interests of states or problem-solving research 
agendas, which maintain the ‘natural’ historical hierarchy of international 
order. Research could focus on how to achieve broader consent, what would 
be on the agenda for such voices, and how peace and the state may be 
reframed accordingly. Research could also focus on how internal systems of 
discrimination, whether on an identity, social class or gender basis may be 
reformed consensually, as well as how far better accountability mechanisms 
might emerge at local, state and international levels. 
 Peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and statebuilding are clearly vital to 
maintaining the current order. They have formed part of the interventionist, 
modernisation and trusteeship project, which has naturalised the current 
international hierarchy. The question is whether this evolving system can still 
aid in the development of a more secure and just order. Can inequality and 
injustice be addressed in an era of structural conflict in order to achieve more 
sustainable forms of reconciliation, while avoiding trusteeship style imposi-
tions? Since the recent New Deal and other indications, including the 
emergence of the G7+,5 there are signs that the necessary structural reforms 
needed to improve global and local-scale legitimacy are returning to the 
international agenda. Intervention, peacebuilding and statebuilding appear to 
be something the international community and populations around the world 
cannot yet do without.
5 Busan Partnership for Effective Develop-
ment Co-operation, Forum on Aid Effec-
tiveness (Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 
November – 1 December 2011). See also 
http://www.g7plus.org/.
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A Gendered Reading of Peace1
Annika Björkdahl
Scholars from various disciplines, theoretical perspectives and methodo-
logical convictions have proposed different pieces of the peace puzzle.2 As 
these sometimes disparate pieces of the puzzle are fit together, the missing 
pieces become more visible. Gender is among them. As gender studies, 
feminist IR scholars and peace and conflict researchers informed by a gender 
perspective have contributed to this puzzle, new and critical questions 
concerning the quality of peace have been raised: Whose peace? Peace for 
whom? How do men and women experience war and peace differently? What  
is a gender-just peace?
 Such questions have helped rethinking progressive peace. Efforts to 
grapple with these questions have influenced and contributed to refashioning 
the agenda of peace education and identified conflict resolution practices 
that are gender-sensitive. By rethinking, peace scholars and peace activists 
alike have advanced peace-intensive notions of politics, power and security, 
added the dimension of militarism by connecting gender and militarism, 
patriarchy and war, and mapped the different effects of conflict on men and 
women, as well as the marginalisation of women in conflict resolution and 
peace processes. These endeavours advance a critical and progressive way  
of thinking about peace, and it becomes clear that looking through the gender 
lens brings “new” aspects of peace to the forefront.
 This article highlights how progressive peace research can be under-
stood from a gender perspective: It situates peace in gender studies and 
rethinks peace beyond the liberal peace paradigm. This article argues that if 
peace research should continue to be a progressive force, it should not shy 
away from discussions about gender but challenge gender hierarchies of 
power and confront various power relations of domination and subordination.
3.1 A Progressive Peace – A Gender-Just Peace
In gender studies, peace is a progressive notion. Yet, efforts to promote 
progressive notions of peace or peace(s) such as positive peace, emancipatory 
peace, gendered peace, or gender-just peace are seen as utopian and thus 
regarded irrelevant to the conventional, conservative analysis of war and 
peace. A gendered reading of peace reveals an understanding of peae that 
moves beyond the negative peace towards what the founder of modern peace 
research, Johan Galtung, coined as positive peace (Galtung, 1969). In contrast 
to the limited negative peace, which refers to the absence of specific forms of 
violence associated with war, positive peace requires not only that all types of 
violence are minimal or non-existent, but also that the major potential causes 
of future conflict are removed. An egalitarian vision of ‘positive peace’ 
generally embodies equality between ethnic and regional groups. Far less 
often does it mention equality among the sexes.
 While gender scholars have critiqued Galtung for neglecting the issue of 
gender in his early writings, his research opened up a space for discussion of 
1 For a more detailed discussion about 
situating peace in gender see the chapter 
Gender - the missing piece in the peace 
puzzle by Annika Björkdahl and Johanna 
Mannergren Selimovic forthcoming in Oli-
ver Richmond et al. Dimensions of Peace 
(Routledge 2015).
2 Debates about peace span both classical 
and contemporary literatures, and a range 
of intellectual debates and it is beyond 
the scope of this article to recapture these 
debates. Oliver P. Richmond, Peace in IR 
Routledge: Abingdon and New York, 2008 
provides an excellent overview of the 
genealogy of peace in IR.
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gender in relation to structural peace and positive peace. In addition, the 
creation of a culture of peace is central to Galtung’s peace concept. A culture 
of peace would include education for peace, the replacement of military 
values with social justice and equality and sharing of political and economic 
power, while tackling poverty and inequality. Galtung’s emphasis on the need 
for peace at the level of the people, in the everyday where women are active, 
rather than the state, where women often lack representation and/or are 
absent, are clearly of particular relevance to conceptualisations of peace from 
a gender perspective.
 In contrast to most models of peace, feminist notions turn the conven-
tional state-centric models upside-down by locating peace at the micro-level 
in the everyday and conceptualise peace ‘from the personal, experiential level’ 
in terms of the lived lives of people on the ground. Gendered readings of 
positive peace have also expanded the understanding of peace to foreground 
gender hierarchies, disclose relations of subordination, and reveal the conti-
nuities of violence, while highlighting various agencies of peace. Clearly, a 
gendered understanding of peace thus diverges substantially from the 
contemporary hegemonic notion of the liberal peace as it finds peace to be 
situated in the everyday and built from below. Such understanding of peace 
brings to the fore equality, social welfare and equity, and by being emanci-
patory and empowering it also provides for a shift in existing power and 
gender relations. 
 A gender-just peace is thus understood not as a reconstruction of the 
pre-war situation, but as a progressive peace that provides for social justice 
and equity, and that recognises women’s social and reproductive roles, and 
women’s agency in relation to local context and everyday issues as well as 
global liberal norms. It is a peace that contributes to a fundamental shift in 
the provision of specific rights related to women’s gender roles, a transfor-
mation of gender relations in society and a redefinition of caste hierarchies. 
3.2 Gendered Peace Gaps
By implication, a gendered peace is distinct from the liberal peace paradigm in 
two ways. A gender-sensitive peace embraces universal values of human 
rights – at the centre of the agenda. And it challenges and criticises liberal 
peacebuilding for being gender-blind and for neglecting the gendered 
dynamics and consequences of large-scale peace-building projects.
 Post-colonial feminists among others have criticised the liberal, univer-
salist agenda and the liberal peace’s echoes of colonialism. Thus, a peace 
meaningful to women i.e. a gender-just peace would require not just the 
absence of armed and gendered conflict locally and globally, but also the 
absence of poverty and the conditions which recreate it. The ‘feminisation’  
of peace or the introduction of gender-just peace is not meant to be comple-
mentary but progresses beyond the liberal peace.
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 The gendering of peace also makes visible the indirect and long-term 
consequences of war over time and destabilises the temporal underpinnings 
of understandings of peace. The period after a conflict can be a period where 
women are more vulnerable to the effects of violent conflict than during the 
conflict itself. It has been pointed out by gender scholars that what women 
gain from the shifts in gender relations during the war they may lose in the 
cusp, in the period between war and peace. Thus the transition from war to 
peace emerges as a critical moment in the shifting terrain of gender power 
and women’s important wartime gains may be lost in peacetime. Cynthia 
Enloe (1987) brings to the fore the feminisation of poverty prior to, in the midst 
of and post-conflict by regarding peace as not just the absence of armed and 
gender conflict but also as the absence of poverty and the conditions which 
recreate poverty. Such understanding allows Enloe to provide us with a 
definition of peace as ‘women’s control over their own lives’.
 Gender-blind peacebuilding practices and the absence of women in the 
peace process hence often produce “peace gaps” that are gendered. Peace 
gaps are shortfalls between internationally brokered peace accords and local 
understandings of a just peace. Women, as subjects of peace, are margin-
alised and their voices nothing but a whisper in the margins. Despite the fact 
that gender empowerment has become a standard tool in international 
peacebuilding, many peace processes are characterised by a conservative 
backlash for women, and this has become a hallmark of women’s post-war 
experience in many places. Thus, few women benefit from the peace dividend 
and this certainly has implications for the quality of peace women experience. 
By showing more respect for the subjects of peace and recognising women as 
subjects of peace, peacebuilding could give women a voice in peace processes 
and provide space for women to exercise agency.
3.3 The Paradox of Gendered Peace
Such critical insights and questions have fed into the rethinking of peace 
within gender studies and continue to be developed in a productive and close 
constitutive relationship with the world of policy and activism. The most 
noticeable advances for gendering peace are linked to the Women Peace and 
Security agenda (WPS) and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 
1325). In 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted the landmark 
resolution 1325 with the ambition to ensure that all aspects of peacebuilding 
and post-conflict reconstruction were to be undertaken with sensitivity 
towards gender. It was a landmark victory for women peace activists and 
lobbyists from all over the world. The UNSCR 1325 stresses three key 
concepts: protection, presence and participation, addressing not only the 
inordinate impact of war on women, but also the pivotal role women should 
and do play in building sustainable peace. The adoption of the resolution has 
in turn triggered an on-going and fruitful critique and further conceptuali-
sation of the gendered peace construed in the resolution, e.g. pointing out  
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how it constitutes women as a homogenous group and delimits their agency 
within the presence and participation paradigm, in a direct dialogue with the 
critical gender research that questions such set roles. 
 The liberal peacebuilding agenda has been partly constituted, partly 
constitutive of these global policy developments, and ideas of human security 
and the UNSCR 1325 are part of the liberal peacebuilding machinery. In this 
sense, the concept of liberal peace has been used to encompass women’s 
rights. Indeed, gender equality is often held up as an intrinsic value of liberal 
peacebuilding and the plight of women and girls has repeatedly been used as 
a raison d’etre for interventions. However, in practice, liberal peacebuilding 
undertakings by international actors at elite level have repeatedly failed to 
pursue gender equality as part of the peace process and the UNSCR 1325 is 
often ignored. As attempts to rearrange gender relations are perceived as 
possibly jeopardising the entire peace process, the issue of women’s rights 
rarely enters peace negotiations making gender invisible in the peace 
settlement and in the post-conflict situation. 
 Thus, despite the fact that local feminist peace activists agendas often 
converge with the universal rights and liberal peace paradigm, gender equality 
is an issue that tends to be downplayed by international actors in response to 
local processes of (re)traditionalisation and social conservatism. This is a 
paradox of gendered power at the core of contemporary liberal peacebuilding. 
3.4 Concluding Reflections
Peace as the absence of war does not measure up and the dominant discourse 
and practice of the liberal democratic peace can no longer set the standard 
for progressive peace. Such peace is fragile and tentative, lacking the condi-
tions which enable it to be continually recreated. Peace is not established 
after the eradication of large-scale violent conflict alone, but when the women 
and men of post-conflict societies themselves perceive there to be an 
everyday peace that includes gender equality, equal rights and opportunities. 
Yet, these issues rarely enter the peace negotiations, making gender issues 
invisible in the peace settlement and in the post-conflict situation. Thus, 
global ideas of a liberal democratic peace and the gendered dynamics of 
peacebuilding need to be confronted if a gender-just and self-sustainable 
peace is to be envisioned. Gendered conceptualisations of peace travel from 
the academic realm of theory to the field of practice and as such impact 
policies and practices pertaining to Human Security, Responsibility to Protect, 
UNSCR 1325 and liberal peacebuilding. Uncovering the gendered hierarchies of 
conventional understandings of peace and revealing the gender dynamics of 
contemporary peacebuilding practices requires that peace research is 
strengthened and informed by a gender perspective.
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4  
Does Ethnic Inclusion Cause 
Peace? Overcoming Problems 
of Endogeneity
Lars-Erik Cederman
Previous empirical research has shown that the exclusion of ethnic groups 
increases the probability of civil war (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010; 
Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). Based on such findings, it is natural to 
conclude that ethnic inclusion would guarantee peace. Yet, power sharing in 
its territorial and governmental forms remains controversial. 
 In part, this is so because ethnic groups’ power access cannot be 
treated as an exogenous factor. Governments may well include or exclude 
groups with an eye to the likelihood of future conflict. Indeed, governmental 
policies toward inclusion or exclusion are endogenous to conflict rather than 
being administered randomly. This article discusses some ways to overcome 
this problem. First, however, a few words about the research question itself 
are in order.
4.1 Exclusion and Ethno-Nationalist Civil War
Ethno-nationalist conflict is arguably the most important type of civil wars. 
Yet, most of the contemporary literature on civil war advances materialist 
accounts based on greed and opportunities inspired by economics while 
regarding explanations rooted in political and economic grievances with 
considerable suspicion (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). 
Applying statistical tools to the problem, the conclusion drawn in some of the 
most influential research is that ethnic groups’ grievances do not drive 
patterns of political violence. In a nutshell, researchers argue that ethnic 
frustrations are too widespread to be linked to internal conflict.
 To a large extent, however, this ubiquity-of-grievances argument 
remains an untested assumption (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). The 
problem is that grievances, including those stemming from political exclusion 
and economic inequality along ethnic lines, are notoriously difficult to 
measure directly (Blattman and Miguel 2010). As argued by Cederman and 
Giardin (2007), the indicators used in the current literature, such as the 
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization index and the Gini coefficient of inequality, 
capture interactions among individuals but say little to nothing about group-
level conflict processes. Rather than being an individualist phenomenon, 
however, ethno-nationalist civil wars are fought between states and rebel 
organisations that claim to represent, and are actually supported by, ethnic 
groups.
 Moreover, the conventional measures of ethnicity are merely 
demographic and therefore do not differentiate between groups that are 
included in the government and those that are not. Analysts who focus on 
ethno-demographic aspects of ethnicity, such as diversity or polarisation, 
thus overlook the power of ethno-nationalism (Cederman 2013). In contrast to 
ethnicity, nationalism is by definition about access to state power. Whereas 
members of ethnic groups sometimes clash in communal conflicts with little 
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state involvement, civil wars ultimately are about control of the state, whether 
the goal is to oust the current government or to create a breakaway state 
through secession.
 While it is hard to capture grievances directly, it is possible to identify 
structural situations in which ethno-nationalist violence might be especially 
likely (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). Wherever ethnically distinct 
populations are ruled by governments perceived to be foreign, the principle of 
nationalism is violated. Viewed as being profoundly unjust by those excluded 
from power, such situations bring forth collective emotions of resentment that 
can be exploited by rebel organisations to challenge the state. In such situa-
tions, the risk of violence increases substantially, as illustrated by the 
conflicts that brought down the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires in the early 
20th century and the European colonial empires during the second half of the 
same century. If subjected to “alien rule”, organisations claiming to represent 
excluded groups may attempt to challenge the government directly or 
indirectly by demanding a greater degree of autonomy or even independence.
 The dataset Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) provides information about 
the power status of all politically relevant ethnic groups around the world from 
1945 and 2009.1 It can be accessed through a data portal on the ICR web page.2 
Focusing on civil wars in sovereign states after the end of World War II, 
research shows that groups excluded from influence over the executive, 
especially those whose power was recently reduced or entirely blocked, are 
much more likely to engage in civil violence than those that enjoy secure 
access to state power (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010; Cederman, 
Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013).
4.2 The Problem of Endogeneity
What is accounting for the increased degree of ethnic inclusion? Gurr (2000) 
holds that the willingness of governments to include ethnic minorities through 
power sharing is the main reason for the pacifying trend since the end of the 
Cold War. However, much existing research comes to fundamentally different 
conclusions, largely arguing against the merits of power sharing institutions 
as a means for conflict management (Bunce 1999; Snyder 2000; Roeder 2005). 
Observing that such arrangements often collapse into fresh violence, there 
are even those who argue that it is better to give “war a chance” as a way to 
redraw the ethnic map and thus produce stability (Luttwak 1999).
 The argument that ethnic inclusion through power sharing often fails is 
not in itself a valid objection if conflict would have broken out sooner, or may 
be even more likely in its absence. Put differently, since power sharing is not 
randomly assigned and in fact probably more likely in difficult cases where 
tensions are high or conflict has already occurred, we cannot conclude that it 
causes more harm than good on the basis of simple static correlations. 
1 The original version of this dataset was 
developed with researchers then at UCLA, 
see Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010).
2 See http://growup.ethz.ch/.
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 Failing to understand this type of reverse causation would lead us to 
identify hospitals as a threat against patients’ health, since more people are 
ill in hospitals than elsewhere. However, the reason why people are hospi-
talised is often that they are seriously ill and are more likely to die (thus the 
positive arrow from death to hospital). This by no means excludes that their 
mortality is actually reduced by seeking medical treatment in a hospital 
(Wucherpfennig 2011).
 Power sharing may look conflict-inducing, whereas in reality, this stems 
from reverse causation because such arrangements are only implemented 
where the risk of conflict is high in the first place (McGarry and O’Leary 2009; 
Grigorian 2012).
 Thus, the reasons for governments’ decisions to exclude or include 
would have to be factored into the analysis, or we would not be able to assess 
their influence on conflict. In fact, the aforementioned results on the link 
between exclusion and conflict also suffer from this potential problem of 
reverse causation (Fearon 2011).
 Rather than naively tallying the power status and political stability in 
case after case, we have to adopt a strategy to overcome the problem of 
reverse causation. One way is to include the very choice of policy into the 
analysis. Another one is to find an alternative measure of power status that is 
not influenced by conflict.
 Striving to overcome these difficulties, the International Conflict 
Research at ETH Zürich has adopted both strategies. In his dissertation, 
Wuchperfennig (2011) explicitly models the reasons why governments decide 
to exclude groups. If this part of the decision-making process is taken into 
account, power sharing does not look so bad anymore, very much like 
hospitals are not inherently lethal. In other words, according to this research, 
power sharing and inclusion are likely to occur when the chances for peace are 
slim to begin with, since governments which have relied on exclusion in the 
past would usually prefer to uphold these types of arrangements unless they 
anticipate a serious threat.
 Relying on the technique of “strategic estimation” (Signorino 1999), 
Wucherpfennig is able to show that once reverse causation is taken into 
account, it turns out that criticisms of power sharing -- at least for post-
conflict situations -- have been overstated. His research shows that the risk of 
conflict outbreak under power sharing is particularly low in the immediate 
aftermath of conflict, and this effect persists for decades, since the risk of 
conflict for exclusionary status quo regimes is consistently higher.
 Illustrating the second approach to endogentity, Wucherpfennig, 
Hunziger and Cederman (2012) attempt to find a measure of exclusion that is 
independent of conflict. Focusing on post-colonial states, they exploit differ-
ences in the colonial empires’ approach to the ethnicity of colonised 
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populations within each colony. Findings indicate that contrary to the French 
ethnically neutral approach that tended to include those groups that were 
close to the coast, the British application of “selective indirect rule” made 
peripheral groups more, rather than less, influential. Thanks to this variation 
in terms of colonial strategies and group locations, they come up with a clean 
estimate of initial exclusion in post-colonial states, and use this variable as an 
explanation of internal conflict. Based on this research strategy, the results 
are very clear: they confirm previous studies that explain ethno-nationalist 
conflict in terms of limited power access. If anything, this work has tended to 
underestimate the actual conflict-inducing impact of political exclusion.
 Even more recently, Cederman, Hug, Schädel and Wucherpfennig (2013) 
exploit differences in the frequency of autonomy arrangements between 
states that emerged from the French and British colonial empires. Whereas 
the French preferred a more direct style of rule, the British often favoured 
autonomous institutions. Based on this contrast, an exogenous measure of 
autonomy can be constructed. This study also comes to the result that 
inclusive institutions become more likely in anticipation of future conflict.
4.3 Conclusions
This brief summary of research suggests that quantitative conflict analysis 
provides us with tools to overcome pitfalls haunting causal analysis of 
conflict. These attempts to address endogeneity support the search for 
policies that stand the best chance of bringing peace to war-torn areas. In 
particular, one should note that ethnic inclusion, usually through power 
sharing, appears to help pacify war-torn countries. Of course, there is no 
guarantee that there will be no reversals in the future. But for now, conflict 
resolution through compromises and decentralisation appears to be a safer 
bet than ethnic domination.
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5  
Critical Notes on Categories of 
Peacebuilding and Peace Research
Briony Jones and Didier Péclard
5.1 Introduction
As peace researchers we are primarily engaged in knowledge production; we 
aim to add value to and shape discourse in ways, which are beneficial for 
increasing understanding of the idea and practice of ‘peace’. The methods 
through which we conduct our research are the subject of lively and necessary 
debates, some of which are reflected in the contributions of this working 
paper. Here, we would like to reflect on a connected issue: that of the making, 
shaping, and use of categories. The way in which we label that which we seek 
to know, and that which we make claims to know, is fundamental to the 
process of research and it has direct implications far beyond the confines of 
the academic community. The use of categories is a necessary way of labelling 
and organising the world around us but it is just as necessary to reflect 
critically on the categories used in peace research. This is because they 
determine the knowledge, which we produce, the way in which it can be 
understood and used by others in a broader scholarly exchange, and the way 
in which it interacts with the practice of peacebuilding. Accordingly, we have 
selected three widely used categories in peace research to reflect on how we 
choose and give content to the categories we use, whether such categories 
are developed a priori or through exchange in the field, connected methodo-
logical challenges, and how such categories can be applied in often fluid and 
complex field environments.
5.2 ‘Peace’ and ‘War’
Debates about the meaning and definition of peace have been at the heart of 
peace research since its early days. During the Cold War, talking about or 
researching peace was by definition political, and war was equally perceived 
and understood as a primarily political project. Since the end of the Cold War 
however, dominant perceptions of peace and war as both analytical categories 
and fields of action have undergone a parallel process of de-politicisation. 
This process has had important effects on the hermeneutics of peace and on 
our understanding of the transition from war to peace. 
 With the gradual institutionalisation of peacebuilding in the wake of the 
1992 Agenda for Peace, ‘peace’ as a category of research and action became 
an increasingly technical matter, which required the development of adequate 
policies and tools by specialised divisions within bilateral and international 
donor agencies. In the time of ‘peace by bureaucratic means’ (Goetschel and 
Hagmann 2009), peacebuilding, in a similar way to development, became an 
‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 1994). In parallel, dominant discourses about 
the origins and causes of violent warfare started to question the idea of war as 
a political project. With widely publicised works such as Collier’s economistic 
perspective on the causes of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1999) and Kaldor’s 
distinction between ‘old and new’ wars, whereby the “new wars” of the 1990s 
were no longer fought “with” or “alongside the people” in defence of clearly 
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articulated political projects sustained by identifiable ideologies, but “against 
the people” by greedy rebels exclusively interested in getting their share of 
the economic and political cake (1999), war equally came to be considered as 
anything but a political project. 
 The main problem with such arguments is that they “serve to set up a 
dichotomy between war as some kind of inherent ‘bad’ (the world ruled by 
instincts and base desire), and peace as an ideal ‘good’ (the world ruled by 
principle and law) (Richards and Helander 2005: 3). But (civil) war is much more 
than a social and moral aberration. It is “not a stupid thing” (Cramer 2006) and 
rather needs to be analysed as “one social project among many competing 
social projects” (Richards and Helander 2005: 3). 
 In that respect, peace research faces two main challenges. Firstly, it 
needs to move away from the tendency to oppose war and peace as distinct 
analytical categories and to focus on the historical, social and political 
continuities between both. Secondly, it needs to reflect on how civil wars 
contribute to shaping and producing political orders, rather than simply 
destroying them (Kalyvas 2006; Arjona 2008; Péclard 2011; Arnaut and 
Højbjerg 2008). Indeed, wars are not only the violent expression of deep-
rooted social conflicts; they are also moments and sites where alternative 
social orders can be created and as such are inherently linked to long-term 
processes of state formation. 
5.3 ‘Local’ and ‘International’
In the context of a recent ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding research (Richmond 
2010 and 2011, MacGinty 2011 and Wallis 2012) the categories of ‘local’ and 
‘international’ remain as pertinent as ever, either to define and target actors 
and spaces, or to be critiqued as analytically and empirically problematic. 
Indeed it seems hard to move beyond potentially simplistic language when 
there still remains a need to talk about and identify different types of actors, 
spaces and practices, which are relevant for peacebuilding. A group of 
scholars have attempted to do just that by engaging with the idea of ‘hybridity’ 
and ‘hybrid peace’ but it is not yet clear whether such work can move us 
forward in this debate. 
 Scholarship on hybrid peace starts from a position of the ‘international’ 
versus the ‘local’ and questions the ways in which external actors intervene in 
post conflict contexts. Such critiques include the imposition of western norms 
of liberalism, a lack of understanding of the local contexts in which violence 
and peace occur, a top-down approach which favours external ‘expertise’ 
rather than local ‘knowledge’ and a one-size-fits all approach in the face of 
diverse local cultures (van Leeuwen, Verkoren and Boedeltje 2012). From these 
critiques has emerged the use of the term ‘hybridity’ as a new taxonomy of 
peacebuilding (Heathershaw 2013). Hybridity as a term has its origins in 
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critical analysis of colonialism, its form and its aftermath (Young 2001). In 
relation to peacebuilding it is described in a multitude of ways according to 
varied perspectives and priorities, but in general terms it is used to refer to 
the mixing and transformation of the liberal (read international or external) 
and the local when they meet in peacebuilding contexts. 
 In the literature ‘hybridity’ is both an analytical lens through which to 
view societies, which are the subject of peacebuilding interventions, and at 
the same time a descriptive term for what scholars of hybridity believe exists 
as a reality on the ground. Importantly, underpinning much of the literature on 
hybridity, particularly that which comes from critical peace studies, is a sense 
of the “supposed transformative power of hybridity” in which resistance 
against particular forms of hegemony provides hope of an alternative to liberal 
peacebuilding interventions from the ‘outside’ (Peterson 2012: 16). However, 
hybrid forms of peacebuilding do not entirely escape the categorisation 
challenges posed by the use of terms such as ‘international’ and ‘local’. In 
much of the literature a notion of distinct categories remain, at least in the 
shadow, despite their supposed mixing and re-shaping. Work by Shaw and 
Waldorf (2010) on localised forms of transitional justice is interesting here as 
they take a somewhat different approach to hybridity and speak instead of 
mutually constitutive positionalities and standpoints rather than fixed 
categories, such as ‘international’ and ‘local’. 
 Research on peacebuilding engaging directly with the complexities of 
empirics is often well placed to draw out such standpoints that cut across the 
categories of local and international and go further towards defending against 
the romanticisation or demonisation of either category (see for example 
Hellmüller 2014 and 2013). If researchers are able to do this then locally 
relevant knowledge and sensitivity to context will start to define the legit-
imacy of any given actor to intervene in a peacebuilding context, rather than  
a fixed categorisation of being either ‘local’ or ‘international’. 
5.4 ‘Identity’
Civil wars have increasingly been considered as resulting from deeply 
engrained divisions between competing communities within a given society, 
and these communities as defined primarily on the basis of their cultural, 
religious, ethnic or social identity. Identity politics, so the argument goes, took 
over from ideology as a factor of conflict. As a consequence, peacebuilding in 
deeply divided societies is also often understood as an effort to bridge 
divisions between the communities that went to war against each other by 
various mechanisms including power sharing, dialogue workshops and 
integrated schooling. There is little doubt that identities have played and 
continue to play an important role in many violent conflicts across the world, 
and that identity politics can have devastating effects in contexts of transition 
from war to peace. The problem, however, is that identities have tended to be 
Critical Notes on Categories of Peacebuilding and Peace Research
38
taken for granted as ontological or primordial categories and thereby risk 
being reified in peacebuilding and peace research despite their inherently 
dynamic and changing nature. 
 Firstly, in research on the role of identities as a source of conflict it is 
important not to conflate causes with instruments. Identities are very potent 
mobilising tools, but waging war in the name of a particular identity group 
does not necessarily mean that the roots of the conflict are ethnic, religious  
or linked to inter-communal enmity. Violent conflict shapes identities as much 
as they are shaped by it. Secondly, identity categories are not necessarily 
efficient as mobilising tools, and their mobilising potential depends on the 
political context, as Péclard (2012) has shown in relation to the mobilisation  
of ethnicity during the anti-colonial war in Angola. Thirdly, framing transition 
processes and peacebuilding interventions on the basis of claims made during 
conflict regarding certain identity categories risks reifying and fixing very 
dynamic processes of identity formation.
 It is crucial therefore for peace researchers to disaggregate and decon-
struct identity categories, even when these are formulated by social actors 
themselves as a crucial element of the conflict or post-conflict political 
settlement. Jones (2009) has taken such an approach in her research on 
reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a country in which an understanding  
of the 1992-1995 war as ethno-national has dominated analyses of conflict 
dynamics and also the design and analyses of peacebuilding interventions. 
Looking specifically at reconciliation policies in the multi-ethnic district of 
Brčko, she has critiqued the way in which peacebuilding actors relied on 
ethno-national identity categories, meaning a policy of reconciliation in which 
mixing of fixed ethno-national categories was not only a pre-condition for a 
reconciliation intervention but was counted as an indication of its success. 
However, case studies on education (2012, 2011a), local government (2011b), 
and interactions with the state (2009 and 2011b), demonstrated that Brčko 
District residents would find ethno-national identity more or less relevant in 
different places and different times, depending on the dynamics of ongoing 
contestations over social and political membership. This illuminated the 
complex, contested and perhaps even contradictory ways in which identity 
categories were independent from, shaped by, and formed in reaction to 
peacebuilding intervention in Brčko District.  
5.5 Concluding Remarks
To return to the questions posed in the introduction, the brief examples given 
here demonstrate that the categories we as peace researchers use to make 
sense of the phenomenon we study are part of an important and ongoing 
exchange about how best to produce and apply knowledge on violence and 
peace. But these categories may also constrain knowledge production if we 
take for granted their content and fix them as immovable points on our episte-
mological landscapes. Innovative, honest methodologies and reflexive work 
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are required to allow for the possibility that the categories we choose to work 
with may not best reflect the realities we seek to shed light on. To hold on to 
categories when they no longer provide us with new or relevant insights is a 
greater danger than to risk re-working or even leaving them behind. Such a 
progression is a necessarily collaborative effort between all those who 
produce knowledge: researchers, practitioners, activists, and the people 
themselves who are the subjects and objects of the work that we do. 
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6  
Critical Peace Research and Policy
Thania Paffenholz
This short essay deals with the question whether peace research, understood 
as a critical science, can be, should be or must be relevant for policy. This 
question is pertinent, but not new at all. 
 Since its inception in the early 1950s, peace research has faced an 
inherent dilemma. Its critical notion has always been in conflict with its policy 
orientation. As a value-oriented science, “peace research must meet the 
needs of the decision-makers” and thus engage with the power holders in the 
international system. This makes proposals for fundamental change in the 
international system practically impossible as “only adaptive change within 
the system is possible” (Schmid, 1968: 229). This observation from the late 
1960s holds true until today. 
 Peace research has always struggled with accusations of being either 
not sufficiently critical or not sufficiently policy relevant. Hence, the core 
question that arises still today is how peace research can be both, policy-
relevant and critical as Jutila, Pehkonen and Väyrynen analyse: the “lack of 
criticality and policy relevance marks, in our view, the death of peace 
research’ (2008: 625).
 The more systematic establishment of a deliberately critical peace-
building research school (CPR) in recent years is a very timely and needed 
endeavour. Its further consolidation with a journal in 2012 (Journal of Peace-
building) and the foundation of a new association for peace and conflict 
studies with an annual conference invites to critically reflect upon the state 
and future direction of critical peacebuilding research with special emphasis 
on its policy orientation.
 How CPR deals with the issue of power is of particular interest here. On 
the one hand, the analysis of power within international and local peace-
building structures is the subject of inquiry of critical peacebuilding. On the 
other hand, the distance of CPR from these power centres shows that critical 
peacebuilding is at risk of becoming a self-referential system that is most 
critical but insufficiently change-oriented.
 Peace research has been an ‘oriented’ science from its inception. It 
wants to contribute to social change and justice. As mentioned, this policy-
oriented notion has always been in conflict with the critical character of peace 
research. How peace research can be a fundamentally critical science and 
relevant to policy at the same time, has been a subject of lively debates in the 
late 1960s. In essence, these debates centred on the core question of 
achieving a certain closeness to power holders without limiting the critical 
essence of research.
 Interestingly this question has not been the subject of much debate in 
CPR while it has been debated in other peacebuilding schools (see below). This 
is puzzling. Has this debate simply been forgotten, deliberately ignored or do 
we see a change in Zeitgeist where CPR does not want to contribute to change 
any more?
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 It is clear that an overemphasis on policy relevance can be the end of 
CPR. Disproportionate focus on policy can narrow the perspective of research 
as only system-immanent changes are analysed and promoted. CPR must 
therefore convince with critical analysis based on solid theoretical reflections 
and robust empirical evidence. But here comes the dilemma: Who should be 
convinced? At the end it is those who hold the power to contribute to change.
 The compartmentalisation of peacebuilding research in different 
schools of thought that do not dialogue with each other has equally 
contributed to narrow foci on certain aspects and a lack of a broader critical 
cum policy-oriented perspective. How the main schools of thought in peace-
building have addressed the ‘policy versus critical’ dilemma is further elabo-
rated below: 
 Many peacebuilding researchers with a conflict management orien-
tation have been successful in producing research that analyses effectiveness 
or ineffectiveness of peacekeeping missions, security sectors, peace negotia-
tions or other aspects of peacebuilding.1 With their work as peacebuilding 
analysts and experts advising decision-makers, they have contributed to 
improving exiting sub-systems. However, this comes at a price of thinking  
and acting within the orthodox box of the liberal paradigm.
 Representatives of the conflict resolution school have continued 
researching and practicing track 2 and track 1.5 dialogue workshops. In some 
cases, these activities resulted in enhanced quality of track 1 negotiations for 
example by providing new ideas or keeping track 1 alive during difficult times. 
Some initiatives have also been successful in connecting local and oppressed 
voices to the track 1 power holders. However, only limited research has been 
conducted analysing the transfer mechanisms used by researchers to influ-
ences change.2 Furthermore, only very few studies in the last 20 years have 
looked into the impact of these processes on change for the system as such  
as well as for the local voices therein.3 
 The conflict transformation school (mainly Lederach theories), have 
changed the peacebuilding practise of a generation of international and local 
peacebuilding NGOs and experts. Lederach’s three-track model and his theory 
of supporting the middle range local actors has become almost a peace-
building mantra. Paffenholz (2014) has, however, shown how the narrow 
interpretation of Lederach’s approach by peacebuilding donors and NGOs over 
the past 20 years has limited the empowerment of local actors.
 CPR – as mentioned earlier – has overall not had traceable impact on 
policy due to its deliberate distance to application. Though, CPR has further 
pushed the focus away from the international to the local in peacebuilding. 
Critical peacebuilding researchers have thereby contributed to a better 
understanding of the ‘local’, hybrid forms of interaction with the international 
as well as forms of resistance in the everyday. CPR has thereby revitalised the 
emancipatory notion of early peace research. However, much of the same 
1 See for example the volumes by the US 
Institute for Peace, i.e. Turbulent Peace or 
Leashing the Dogs of War.
2 See notable exceptions: Cuhadar, E. and 
Dayton, B. (2012). Oslo and its aftermath. 
Lessons learnt from Track Two diplomacy. 
Negotiation Journal 28(2), 155–179 as well 
as Fisher, R. J. (1997). Interactive conflict 
resolution. In: Zartman, I. W. (ed). Peace-
making in international conflict: Methods 
and techniques. Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press.
3 See for a complilation of such works: 
Paffenholz, T. (2010). Civil society and pea-
cebuilding: A critical assessment. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner.
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questions that peace researchers have asked themselves in a phase of critical 
self-reflection in the late 1960s and early 1970s, are still debated in CPR. At 
the core of these debates has been the question how CPR can contribute to 
emancipation when the subaltern is only allowed to speak through the lens of 
the researcher. Research has insufficiently contributed to the empowerment 
of the very ‘local’ and its agency (Paffenholz, 2014) as highlighted by the Latin 
American researcher Paulo Freire in his ‘Pedagogy of the oppressed’, where he 
emphasises that there is no pedagogy that is truly liberating that remains 
distant from the oppressed without involving them in what is to benefit them 
at a later time (1993). Hence, as Roberts (2011) has criticised, the inability of 
CPR to translate its emancipatory notion in research into alternatives to 
existing liberal peace orders remains a core challenge.
 The challenges associated with alternatives to the liberal project are 
manifold: First, CPR as a matter of theoretical and moral principle in line with 
Foucault does not want to present meta-alternatives to the exiting order of 
the liberal international peacebuilding project. Second, even if that principle 
would be nullified or some researchers would not rely on it, CPR has so far 
been unable to suggest valid alternatives to the liberal project. Third, within 
the debate on hybrid forms of governance, we find hidden alterative 
discourses that are, however, not made explicit and also not thought through 
in a critical or policy-oriented way. Moreover, the way these possible alterna-
tives are put forward open the ground to misuse leading to more oppression 
and less emancipation. To avoid being misused by power politics in providing 
alternatives to power holders that support their power systems, CPR needs to 
face the challenge of being policy relevant in a responsible way.
 Transferring research results into policy is not an easy undertaking. 
What kinds of research result are being used to inform policy has also to do 
with the power of transfer in general.4 There is a new species of peacebuilding 
experts that have impact on policy. They come from research, NGOs or consul-
tancy firms. They advise or work for governments, multilateral organisations 
or international and local NGOs. They are formed in degree programmes and  
a multitude of executive education programmes around the world. Due to the 
above-described compartmentalisation of peacebuilding research and 
education, attending a training or degree programme based on a holistic 
overview of the discipline is hardly possible. Hence, in general terms, these 
experts can be clustered along these different schools. This, in suit, deter-
mines the kind of advice decision-makers receive and what schools of thought 
influence policies. Andrew Mack has demonstrated, for example, how Paul 
Collier’s research on ‘Greed and Grievances’ (despite heavy methodological 
critique on his statistical methods by established colleagues) has gained 
momentum in policy due to his post as research director at the World Bank. 
This confirms results on successful transfer from track 2 to track 1 as the 
proximity to decision-makers has been the most influential transfer 
mechanism identified. Direct advice and the provision of readymade ‘how-to’ 
tools that reduce the complexity in peacebuilding to an almost meaningless 
undertaking, are also high on the agenda of decision-makers when asked how 
4 See Mack, A. (2002). Civil War: Academic 
Research and the Policy Community.  
Journal of Peace Research, 39(5), 515-525.
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they make use of research. This makes peacebuilding a technical endeavour 
(Hagmann and Goetschel, 2009). This critique is not new: Already in the early 
1970s, researchers criticised that peace researchers have become the tools  
of the establishment contributing to social engineering by simplifying the 
research results in order to sell them to decision-makers. Schmid (1968) has, 
however, argued that a certain technicality in peacebuilding is needed to make 
it useful for decision-makers.
 Though the technical nature of peacebuilding is a risk, there is another 
development that in fact shows that adding substance to the policy debate is 
not an easy task. When looking at the latest UN reports on peacebuilding or 
the World Development Report on Fragility and Conflict, it becomes evident 
that primarily researchers have authored these documents. These are overall 
documents of good quality as they provide useful overviews and analyses 
including current trends and challenges. As Heathershaw (2008) notes, 
nevertheless, all possible challenges and critique that could be absorbed into 
the existing systems is taken into account. In consequence, these documents 
are theoretically guiding policies, but practically, they are so complicated that 
practitioners on the ground rarely use them as guidance for operations. 
 In conclusion, the debate shows first that combining a critical and a 
policy-oriented notion in peace research is a challenging undertaking. Second, 
the attempt to be policy-oriented does not come easily into action. However, 
the problem within CPR is that it does not even wish to face these challenges 
and has so far shied away from debating transfer mechanisms that allow for 
critical reflection and change orientation at the same time. This short essay 
has not intended to provide the reader with ready-made answers but rather 
calls for a substantial debate on the future direction of critical peacebuilding 
scholarship as responsible scholarship in an understanding of Chomski’s 
‘Responsibility of the Intellectuals’ (1967).
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7  
Evaluation and Funding 
in Peace Research
Michael Brzoska
A quantitative evaluator, a qualitative evaluator, and a normal person are 
waiting for a bus. The normal person suddenly shouts, “Watch out, the bus is 
out of control and heading right for us! We will surely be killed!” 
 The quantitative evaluator calmly responds, “That is an awfully strong 
causal claim you are making. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that 
buses can kill people, but the research does not bear it out. People ride buses 
all the time and they are rarely killed by them. The correlation between riding 
buses and being killed by them is very nearly zero. It is such an extraordinary 
thing to be killed by a bus, I wouldn’t worry.”
 When the normal person continues to shout: “The bus is coming, it will 
kill us,” the qualitative evaluator interjects, “What exactly do you mean by 
bus? After all, we all construct our own understanding of that very fluid 
concept. For some, the bus is a mere machine, for others it is what connects 
them to their work, their school, the ones they love. I mean, have you ever sat 
down and really considered the bus-ness of it all? I hope I am not being too 
forward, but may I be a critical friend for just a moment? I don’t think you’ve 
really thought this whole bus thing out. It would be a pity to go about pushing 
the sort of simple linear logic that connects something as conceptually 
complex as a bus to an outcome as one dimensional as death.”
 Very dismayed, the normal person runs away screaming, the bus 
collides with the quantitative and qualitative evaluators, and it kills both 
instantly.
 Very, very dismayed, the normal person begins pleading with a 
bystander, “I told them the bus would kill them. The bus did kill them. Why 
didn’t they believe me?”
 To which the bystander replies, “Tut tut, my good man. I am a 
“randomista”, an expert on the analysis of cause and effects. And I can tell 
you that with a sample size of 2 and no proper control group of people not hit 
by a bus, you cannot possibly conclude with confidence that it was the bus 
that did them in.1 
Evaluation is a serious matter. Not a matter of life and death, but very often  
of careers, projects and programmes, including in peace research. 
 What are good research projects which merit a part of the very scarce 
funds available for peace research? Unsurprisingly, views on this issue differ.  
I venture that two are dominant, both of which are problematic. 
1 Adapted from http://savageminds.
org/2010/04/01/major-changes-at-aaa/
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7.1 Research over Peace
The evaluation of research projects with the focus on research almost by 
nature needs to be given to specialists in the same field. Who else would be 
able to assess whether a project proposal is adding to knowledge? While this 
is true, there are potential caveats of specialist peer-review. Worthy projects 
get rejected, for instance, because they are seen as a threat by an academic 
rival. In most cases, however, peer-reviewing results in overly positive reviews. 
Evaluators are interested in more research in their field, as more research will 
likely lead to more citations of their work and thus improve their own citation 
ranks.
 Moreover, peace research has grown into a field with specialists of 
different theoretical and methodological strands (see Thania Paffenholz’s 
contribution). Their tendency to recommend projects within their own 
specialty makes unbiased project reviews by funding bodies difficult. Some 
common standards are required. Two standards are currently the central 
evaluation hallmarks for research projects in peace research: the “puzzle”  
and “professionalism in methodology”.
 On the one hand, researchers need to find a “desideratum”, something 
worthy of explanation but defying available explanations, or where various 
explanations diverge. This requirement favours projects that aim to fill, even 
tiny, gaps in bodies of existing knowledge over the development or rethinking 
of such bodies of research. On the other hand, applicants need to very clearly 
show how they want to arrive at their conclusions. Although the requirement 
for applicants to reflect about epistemology and methodology in their 
proposals is laudable, the strong emphasis on laying out – prior to the project 
start – when what will be done why in case the project is funded, can be a 
straightjacket later on. There are defensive measures available for applicants, 
such as claiming to do grounded theory, or simply doing whatever seems best 
once the project is funded, but these may be punished in later applications.
Both criteria favour projects which seek incremental, very well-substantiated 
increases in knowledge. As a result, they feed into the general tendency in 
social sciences of fads, of the prominence of certain topics that come and go. 
In the 1990s, for instance, ethno-political conflict was a very prominent 
research topic, in the 2000s it was resource conflicts; Peacebuilding in the 
1990s, criticism of liberal peacebuilding in the 2000s, US hegemony in the 
1990s, power transition in the 2000s.
 Conforming to a purist approach to science, political or societal objec-
tives are not among the recognised priorities in current peace research 
evaluations. Research should not be normative. The selection of priorities is  
at the discretion of the projects combined with the implicit assumption for 
projects to be innovative in whatever direction. Such a position is problematic 
in peace research which by definition and intellectual history has a normative 
agenda. However, even academic reviewers who generally adopt a normative 
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approach are often reluctant to discuss how their proposed project links to 
peace. In most cases, this means that the two criteria mentioned above, the 
puzzle and methodological professionalism are decisive with regard to funding 
decisions.
7.2 Peace over Research
The other strand in the evaluation of peace research projects favours “peace” 
over “research”. One rarely finds this approach in the academic world of 
national research foundations and their likes. It is in the realm of govern-
ments, particular development ministries, private foundations, consultants 
and NGOs, where this approach is applied.
 Again emphasising critical tendencies, one can argue that the evalu-
ation of applied research and consultancy selects research as a tool for 
activism. Research is judged more by its likelihood to legitimise action than  
its contribution to knowledge. 
 Security sector reform (SSR), for instance, has become a major tool for 
donor strategies in many transition and post-conflict countries. The number  
of projects in this domain has grown. The German government, which is not 
among the most active in this domain, recently listed almost one hundred 
projects, mostly in Africa, predominantly in police reform. Some of these can 
be classified as research projects, as the focus is on increasing knowledge 
about SSR and its precondition or consequences.2
 Based on personal impressions, most evaluations, both of proposals 
and post-project, are critical but constructive. They identify deviations from 
the original list of objectives or implementation shortcomings. But they also 
see some positive benefits in advancing knowledge about SSR. A rather 
unsurprising finding, since the request for evaluation was based on the idea  
of improving SSR.
 In contrast to this assessment of the average SSR project, the academic 
community has by and large a very critical view of SSR as a strategy for peace 
and development.3 Clearly, there are differences between the academic and 
the activist world with respect to the expectations of the type of social change 
which external interventions can bring about: Between high-flying ideas about 
building peace and development, and the toils on the ground of the day-to-day 
struggles for better societies. But there is also the element of finding success 
when looking for it.
2 The list is not public. For a summary see 
Permanseder, M. (2013). Das deutsche 
Engangement bei der Sicherheitssektor-
reform in Afghanistan am Beispiel des 
Polizeiaufbaus. Zeus Working Paper 5. 
Hamburg: Institute for Peace Research and 
Security Policy.
3 See for example Schnabel, A. and Farr, V. 
(2012). Back to the Roots: Security Sector 
Reform and Development. Berlin/Zurich: 
LIT Verlag.
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7.3 Strengthening the Middle Ground
Where does this assessment of the two strands of evaluation leave us? My 
conclusion is that both types of evaluations, with their differing criteria and 
idiosyncrasies, create biases, towards incremental research on the one hand, 
and affirmative research on the other.
 One consequence is that the two research strands often find it hard to 
speak to each other. Literally, because a good part of academic research is 
disseminated through publications which require not only a degree in the 
relevant discipline but also additional special training in certain methodol-
ogies, theories, or jargons as an entry ticket. Figuratively, because many 
academic researchers do not find research in the context of project evalua-
tions relevant, as it has not been conducted with the strict methodology they 
consider necessary. As a result, a sizeable portion of academic research never 
filters into activism-oriented research, even though it should, and academic 
research misses out on both data and knowledge from activists that would 
improve its own contribution to knowledge.
 Another consequence is that research in the “middle” is disadvantaged. 
Academically sound research with a broad scope aiming at informing political 
or practical work for peace without seeking immediate applicability will have 
difficulties to either meet the “puzzle” and “professionalism” or the activism 
standards. As a result, there is a considerable lack of research that is results-
oriented and critical at the same time, methodologically informed but not 
hooked on knowing all steps in research upfront. There was definitely more of 
it in the past, for instance in works by Johan Galtung, E.O. Czempiel or Dieter 
Senghaas.4
 What can be done to strengthen the “middle ground”? There are some 
simple measures, which however, are rather difficult to implement. To begin, 
research foundations should adapt their criteria for research funding to be 
more open to topical, interdisciplinary research. In Germany for example, the 
German Research Foundation (DFG) long was sceptical. In recent years it has 
become more open, and a good share of peace research, including some 
interdisciplinary and less incremental research is funded by the DFG.
 A second strategy is to get universities to fund more chairs in peace 
research, including in disciplines where peace research is not well estab-
lished, such as in the natural sciences and economics, and in interdisciplinary 
centres. Recently, particularly in the United States, but also in Germany, such 
efforts have been quite successful. But the number of chairs in peace 
research remains very small in most parts of the world. Often seed funding is 
needed for the establishment of chairs. 
 Motivating governments and affluent NGOs to fund research into peace 
beyond their immediate needs is a third strategy. The German government has 
4 See for example Galtung, J. Johan Galtung 
and Fischer, D. (2013). Johan Galtung: 
Pioneer of Peace Research. Heidelberg: 
SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science 
and Practice; Czempiel, E. (1989). Global 
Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Ap-
proaches to World Politics for the 1990s. 
Lanham: Lexington Books; Senghaas, D. 
(2012). Dieter Senghaas: Pioneer of Peace 
and Development Research. Heidelberg: 
SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and 
Practice.
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done so, and so have other governments, but with limited scope. The Swiss 
and UK governments that have gone furthest in this direction and have funded 
research centres on specific topics, such as fragile states, small arms and 
SSR, and also supported NGOs which have a research portfolio, such as 
International Alert or Saferworld, and indeed swisspeace. There are also some 
privately-funded NGOs supporting good work in the field, such as Oxfam in the 
UK and the Berghof Foundation in Germany. Some important peace research 
has also been funded by foundations, such as the Open Society Institute on 
democratisation, or on nuclear disarmament by the McArthur and Ford 
Foundations.
 Finally, a fourth strategy is to establish public foundations which 
specifically aim at peace research, with criteria that differ from those for 
disciplinary research, such as in Germany in 2001, when the German 
Foundation for Peace Research (DSF) was established by the government. It 
received the explicit mandate to fund research with the objective to promote 
peace. There are few other such foundations in the world, and the DSF 
remains a very small institution, with not much more than half a million Euro 
to allocate to research per year.
 None of these strategies is a panacea; they all have their challenging 
aspects. Fortunately, they are complementary. But they all suffer from the 
same basic problem: a lack of resources. Within large research foundations, 
the competition is tough. And programmes which do not follow the general 
trend, and peace research is not one of those, are generally precarious. The 
same is often true for universities. Funding by governments, NGOs and 
foundations for peace research also often has to be justified with respect to 
other priorities.
 This brings us back to the beginning: evaluations. Money is short in all 
the named institutions. So decisions have to be made on the basis where 
money is best spent. Evaluations cannot be avoided. But evaluations which 
are less self-referential to the systems from which they emanate, and more 
attentive to the combination of peace and peace research, would be a 
welcome new trend.
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8  
Assessing Quality in Peace Research
Laurent Goetschel and Sandra Pfluger
1 This paper focuses exclusively on the 
assessment of quality in peace research 
project and their design. It does not 
provide any statements on performance 
evaluation or measurement.
Peace research as a discipline polarises as much as peace as a concept. 
Peace and peace research are both positioned between vastly differing 
expectations and reflections. If peace is seen as a purely idealistic goal 
without meaning in the real world, there is little to be desired from research. 
Understood as a goal with relevance for action, however, peace and peace 
research merit the highest priority.
 The era of the Cold War gave an additional twist to the interpretations  
of peace stemming from the threat to humanity posed by the superpowers and 
the doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence. Technically, this threat remains in 
place, but its immediacy has lessened considerably due to changes at the 
geopolitical level. This polarised view of peace was also reflected in the 
appraisal of peace as an object of scientific inquiry. Peace researchers saw 
themselves as admonishers in a bi-polar world marked by nuclear self-
destruction (Deutsch, 1972). They were primarily indebted to ethical standards 
in their identity as researchers, and saw their critical position vis-à-vis official 
policies and viewpoints as a result of their scientific endeavours. Their critics, 
in turn, saw them as ideological products devoid of any scientific quality. Such 
debates already existed between World War I and World War II. They mainly 
revolved around the significance of the League of Nations. States as well as 
intellectuals tried to lend credence to collective security in order to 
strengthen trust between former wartime enemies in Europe.
 This brief historical reference already provides four key elements that 
help to understand the debate on quality1 in peace research. First, the 
assessment of quality is subject to the fundamental understanding of peace. 
This understanding remains a much discussed and - in its current configu-
ration - contested concept. Second, peace research is an inherently critical 
scientific field. Critical reflection of prevalent positions in scientific or societal 
realms forms a constitutive aspect of any peace research. Peace research 
pursues new forms of social learning and their conditions for implementation 
(Linklater, 1996). Third, peace research contains an ethical component; the 
prevention or reduction of violence constitutes its common normative basis. 
The orientation of peace research does not derogate its scientificity. In no way 
does this orientation determine the theoretical or methodological design of 
peace research, nor does it curtail the diversity of approaches. In contrast, it 
lends direction in view of thematic foci and research questions. Finally, peace 
research is in constant exchange with decision-makers and other users of 
research findings. Peace research claims to have an impact.
 Since the end of the Cold War and the associated bloc thinking, the 
discussion around the relevance of peace has partly stabilised. In interna-
tional politics, peace no longer figures as a polarising political concept, but 
has established itself as a core objective in numerous programmes funded by 
states and international organisations. Within peace research, this trend has 
generated interesting debates between action-oriented, evidence-based 
research on the one hand, and predominantly norm-oriented, ethical contribu-
tions on the other (Jaberg, 2009). In addition, adjacent scientific fields such as 
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development or sustainability studies, which share certain commonalities 
with peace research, have evolved and add meaningful points to the debate.
8.1 Interdisciplinarity and Transdisciplinarity
The commonalities are found in their interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary 
approaches, for instance. Peace processes are part of societal change and 
their dimensions are manifold (economic, societal, political, historic, techno-
logical, etc.). Consequently, adequate scientific inquiry into aspects of peace 
processes requires the integration of knowledge from multiple disciplines. Not 
every study in the area of peace research needs to be designed in an interdis-
ciplinary fashion. However, such studies should take pertinent findings of 
other fields into consideration, and be designed such that they are compatible 
with future interdisciplinary work in other disciplines.
 Transdisciplinarity stems from the self-understanding of peace 
research as the practice-oriented science mentioned above. Peace research 
by definition is geared toward application (Imbusch, 2005). This does not mean 
that peace research only generates directly applicable results. Rather peace 
research strives to produce knowledge accessible to the actors concerned, 
who can then utilise the results. This exchange beyond disciplinary confines is 
also seen as a criterion assuring quality in peace research and contributing to 
securing scientific excellence. Transdisciplinarity has a host of implications, 
from the selection of the research question, to the choice of methodology and 
the design of the research process, and the communication of findings and 
their application (Pohl and Hirsch Hadorn, 2007). Research for development 
has produced numerous results, which – adapted accordingly – are also 
meaningful for peace research (Jones et al., 2012).
 Consequently, peace research projects must pay due regard to the 
environment in which they are situated. Should peace research fail to do so, it 
risks disintegrating into a technocratic, ethno-centric science detached from 
any realistic foundation. It must first and foremost hold itself to the same 
standards it demands from peacebuilders (Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009; 
Hilhorst and van Leeuwen, 2005). This standard may be analysed, reflected 
and discussed from different perspectives.
 For instance, if the foreign relations of a country are the object of peace 
research, then the respective (foreign) policy culture and, particularly, the 
pertinent decision-making processes are to be considered; research question, 
process and design are to be structured such as to ensure – with high proba-
bility – that relevant decision-makers take note of the findings. In this area of 
foreign policy, peace research is not only about the standards of pertinence in 
the findings, e.g. in the frame of foreign policy analysis, but also about the 
field of policy advice and the ethics of advising (Rungius, 2013).
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2 The relevant mind-sets originate from 
research in the frame of development 
programmes, but are highly pertinent for 
activities in the field of peace research. 
See for example Anderson, 1999.
 In the case of peace research in a conflict context, a set of additional 
standards comes into play. For researchers from an OECD country, for 
example Switzerland, questions concerning the objectives of the research, the 
role of research partners and the links between research and the conflict arise 
(Richmond, 2011). The inherent notion of applicability of peace research 
demands a concrete contribution to peace. The research should aspire to have 
an impact on the object of inquiry or its environment. Consequently, research 
that solely strives to complete data sets, does not meet the quality standards 
of peace research, while its general scientific relevance remains intact.
8.2 Conflict Sensitivity
Finally, conflict sensitivity constitutes a specific principle in the assessment 
of quality in peace research. It requires actors in conflict contexts to pay due 
attention to preventing harm; not in the sense of intentionally aggravating a 
situation, but rather by disregarding certain cares and, thereby, inadvertently 
fuelling existing local tensions.2 Similarly to research partnerships, the 
principle of conflict sensitivity is more easily formulated on paper than put 
into practice. Challenges span from terminology choices, to the interaction 
with interview partners or the placing of field studies, to the handling of data 
and the communication of results. Researchers need to consider that their 
research and interview partners remain on site after the completion of a 
research project. They also need to understand that certain expressions or 
statements may have unexpected meanings in a specific context and thus 
provoke sensitivities.
 What is more, insights from research for development show that 
research partnerships – research in teams, where researchers from the 
respective conflict contexts and external researchers cooperate on equal 
footing – are particularly suitable to meet the above-mentioned standards of 
peace research. Extensive guidance papers and reports on experiences with 
research partnerships are already available in the broader field of devel-
opment (KFPE, 2009; Maselli, Lys and Schmid, 2004).
 Peace research essentially seeks to generate knowledge on topics 
related to conflict and pertinent conflict contexts. As a practice-oriented 
science, it should feed the knowledge gained back into the relevant conflict 
context with the goal of transforming conflict (Goetschel, 2009) and, thereby, 
building peace. The capacity to do so defines the specific value added of 
peace research vis-à-vis other fields of research. The value added is based on 
the normative preconception of peace research, its relation with disciplinarity, 
transdisciplinarity, conflict sensitivity and application as well as the implica-
tions for applied research. 
 Many of the above points have been taken up in the practice of peace 
research. While a strong need for discussion remains, many researchers 
orientate themselves along the aforementioned criteria, which have their 
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roots in specific epistemological traditions, e.g. action research (Reason and 
Bradburg, 2008), grounded theory (Birks and Mills, 2011), interpretative 
research (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012), and in experiences from peace-
building. Even if peace research approaches are more often associated with 
qualitative than with quantitative designs, they are in principle not 
constrained in terms of methodology.
 However, quality assessment criteria for the evaluation of peace 
research remain vague. Often, these criteria do not only vary to a usual degree, 
but structurally and systematically diverge from researchers’ own standards. 
For example, conflict sensitivity and transdisciplinarity are rarely found 
among evaluation criteria of research programmes. In some exceptional 
cases, transdisciplinarity is a criterion in very specific funding instruments. 
This may once have been based on general suspicion of peace research, but 
today is more often due to a lack of understanding with regards to the 
concerns of this kind of research. 
 To sum up, interdisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity and conflict sensitivity 
form the cornerstones of quality assessment criteria in peace research. The 
actual handling of these terms begs for a differentiated framework or guide-
lines, which help evaluating bodies to assess projects in line with the diverse 
requirements of peace research.
 The main criteria for the assessment of quality in peace research are:
Relevance
The significance of the research question for peace research (basic 
knowledge) and the contribution of the research to the reduction of violence or 
the prevention of conflict can be assessed based on the relevance criterion.
 → Does the research make an innovative contribution to peace research?
 → Does the research add to existing knowledge or bring in new aspects?
 → Does the research question have the potential to contribute to the 
reduction of violence or the prevention of conflict?
Scientific notion
The criterion of scientific notion serves to assess the critical notion of peace 
research as a discipline and to ensure the consideration of thematically 
relevant, normative and ethical aspects.
 → Does the research clarify its link to thematically relevant, normative and 
ethical aspects?
 → Does the research clearly differentiate theoretical and methodological 
aspects from normative-ethical considerations?
 → Does the research apply a critical approach to prevalent practices and 
theories?
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Interdisciplinarity
Interdisciplinarity ensures that the notion of peace is presented from different 
disciplinary perspectives and that the complexity of topics contained in peace 
research are integrated.
 → Does the research present the relevant notion of peace from different 
disciplinary perspectives?
 → Does the research integrate scientists from different disciplines?
 → Does the research design allow for an adequate integration of complexity 
and different perspectives?
Transdisciplinarity
Transdisciplinarity assures due consideration of the significance of the 
research question for peacebuilding practice and the compatibility of the 
results for users beyond academia.
 → Does the research link to current questions of peacebuilding?
 → Does the research question correspond to a potential interest of practi-
tioners and policy-makers?
 → Did the research identify and include relevant actors from practice, policy 
and society in the development of the research question?
 → Have measures been taken to ensure that relevant actors from practice, 
policy and society have an interest in the findings?
 → Does the research include an approach to communicate adequately with 
actors outside the realm of science?
Conflict sensitivity
Based on the conflict sensitivity criterion, the conflict context and the “Do No 
Harm” principle are duly considered.
 → Does the research process take into account the prevalent tensions of the 
conflict context?
 → Does the research formulate goals (research questions) that specifically 
pertain to the conflict context?
 → Does the research respect the principle of “Do No Harm” (non-aggravation 
of prevalent tensions)?
 → Does the research take into account the safety of research partners, 
particularly interviewees?
 → Does the research team have sufficient expertise in terms of the conflict 
context and are local researchers included in the team?
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